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461 
PROCEED WITH CAUTION: THE IMPLICATIONS 
OF THE OMB PEER REVIEW GUIDELINES ON 
PRECAUTIONARY LEGISLATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine this situation: A nervous young father is eager to help his flu-
ridden daughter feel better. To alleviate her pain, as any parent would do, 
he opens the medicine cabinet for some aspirin, checks the warning and 
dosage label, and administers the medication to his child. She later 
develops Reye’s syndrome—a rare but debilitating disease that can be 
fatal. Unbeknownst to this parent, studies had revealed a higher incidence 
of Reye’s syndrome in children who had been given aspirin to ease pain 
caused by certain viral infections. No warning label existed because the 
aspirin industry was fighting government efforts to include a warning label 
despite four studies linking Reye’s syndrome to aspirin use.1 The industry 
successfully persuaded the government to undertake further studies, but in 
December 1985, the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) finally issued a 
proposal mandating labels cautioning potential users about the risks of 
Reye’s.2 Since 1986, labels have been included on all aspirin bottles 
warning that administering aspirin to children with colds, flu, or chicken 
pox, could lead to an increased chance of developing Reye’s syndrome.3 
Had the government been authorized to act in a timelier manner, perhaps 
more instances of this illness could have been avoided.4  
Citizens expect their government to promulgate rules and regulations 
that are based on accurate information.5 Agencies are generally considered 
 
 
 1. See Joseph Gastwirth, The Need for Careful Evaluation of Epidemiological Evidence in 
Product Liability Cases: A Reexamination of Wells v. Ortho and Key Pharmaceuticals, 2 LAW PROB. 
& RISK 151, 156 (2003). 
 2. Proposed Labeling for Oral Aspirin-Containing Drug Products, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,400 (Dec. 
17, 1985).  
 3. Labeling for Oral and Rectal Over-the-Counter Aspirin and Aspirin-Containing Drug 
Products, 51 Fed Reg. 8180 (Mar. 7, 1986). For a detailed factual account of the history surrounding 
the efforts to include warning labels, see American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 672 
F. Supp. 135, 137–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).  
 4. See Letter from Joseph L. Gastwirth, Professor of Statistics, George Washington University, 
to Jack B. Weinstein, Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York (Mar. 13, 2001) (concluding that some 100 cases of Reye’s syndrome might have been 
prevented had the FDA issued warnings in 1982).  
 5. Donald T. Hornstein, Accounting for Science: The Independence of Public Research in the 
New, Subterranean Administrative Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2003, at 246 (“Science is 
an enormously important public resource in a free society, and there are, accordingly, enormous 
benefits in maintaining public confidence in its underlying integrity as a process.”). 
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to have expertise in their particular field of regulation, and are trusted to 
use this expertise to make policy decisions in the best interest of society. 
Agencies rely on scientific studies to guide them in making these policy 
choices, but this guidance is rarely conclusive as even the most advanced 
scientific research will leave some questions unanswered.6  
For instance, when experiments are conducted to determine the toxicity 
of particular chemicals, the data cannot establish a “safe” level of 
exposure.7 Instead, it is the agency officials who must consider competing 
policy concerns in quantifying the risk at an appropriate level.8 Moreover, 
it is very difficult, if not unethical, to conduct research with respect to 
many of the greatest public health and environmental concerns.9 As a 
result, agencies are often forced to make decisions based on scientific 
research riddled with uncertainty.10  
Concrete assurances that the benefits of a given regulation will 
outweigh its risks seem the best way to ensure the administration of true 
“justice.”11 However, this goal is difficult to reconcile with the field of 
science where research is hampered with uncertainty.12 Such uncertainty 
should not bar all regulations, but most would agree that some restraints 
 
 
 6. See Wendy E. Wagner, The “Bad Science” Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the Role of 
Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2003, at 
64 (“Science teases policymakers with the prospect of providing definitive guidance for regulatory 
decisionmaking. But in reality, the information that most scientific research provides to health and 
environmental regulation is incomplete and inconclusive . . . .”).  
 7. See Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
1613, 1622 (1995) (explaining that while scientific experiments can establish the effects of certain 
substances on controlled subjects in controlled circumstances, the quantitative risk to humans can not 
be conclusively resolved through science, leaving those gaps to be filled by policy choices).  
 8. Id. at 1622 n.28 (defining “policy” to include “the reasoned weighing of various economic 
and social outcomes . . . [and] the conscious or subconscious biases, guesses, and intuition of 
decisionmakers.”). 
 9. Id. at 1621 (identifying the ethical limitations of toxic testing that force scientists to 
extrapolate from animal studies rather than conduct experiments on human subjects).  
 10. See Wagner, supra note 7, at 1619–22 (describing the limits of science in the context of risk 
assessment and explaining that where science is unable to provide a conclusive answer, policy 
considerations must fill in these gaps). 
 11. See David Kriebel et al., The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science, 109 ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSP. 873, 875 (2001) (“Although there are some situations in which risks clearly exceed 
benefits no matter whose values are being considered, there is usually a large gray area in which 
science alone cannot (and should not) be used to decide policy.”).  
 12. See Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better 
Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1063–64 (1997) (“Because no theory is 
ever proven to an absolute certainty, no bright line separates hunches from established scientific 
knowledge . . . . Reliance on science must, by necessity, include reliance on some hunches.”). See also 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (“[A]rguably, there are no certainties 
in science.”). 
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upon regulation are still necessary.13 Given that scientific uncertainty is a 
reality, the government must be equipped to promulgate protective 
regulations notwithstanding unanswered questions regarding the degree of 
harm the regulated entity may present.14 
Congress has addressed this concern by passing several statutes 
authorizing agencies to promulgate regulations even where the science 
fails to provide a conclusive answer.15 For example, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized by statute to regulate hazardous air 
pollutants to protect public health by an “ample margin of safety,”16 and 
contaminants in drinking water if it is shown that they “may have an 
adverse effect on the health of persons.”17 These and other similarly 
worded statutes are said to exemplify a precautionary approach to 
regulation by embodying what is commonly referred to as the 
precautionary principle.18 
Concerned that such precautionary statutes led too many agencies to 
disseminate inaccurate information and promulgate regulations on the 
basis of insufficient science, lawmakers sought to establish more stringent 
guidelines that would improve agency science.19 The push for “sound 
science” can be traced back to the tort and regulatory reform movements 
of the Reagan Administration.20 One of the most tangible results of this 
 
 
 13. Hornstein, supra note 5, at 246.  
 14. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 463 U.S. 29, 52 
(1983) (“It is not infrequent that the available data does not settle a regulatory issue and the agency 
must then exercise its judgment in moving from the facts and probabilities on the record to a policy 
conclusion.”).  
 15. See infra text accompanying notes 48–53. 
 16. Clean Air Act (CAA) § 112(d)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(4) (2000). 
 17. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 18. The precautionary principle is discussed more fully infra notes 43–54. In general, this 
approach favors government action despite scientific uncertainty, if the risks of inaction could harm 
human health or the environment. See SIDNEY SHAPIRO & ROBERT GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT 
RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 15 (2003) (describing risk regulation as a congressional 
tool designed to “permit the government to act on the basis of anticipated harm”).  
 19. One example of congressional attempts to improve agency science came in the form of the 
Data Access Amendment, also known as the Shelby Amendment. See infra text accompanying note 
64. In justifying his namesake legislation, Senator Richard Shelby stated: “Public confidence in the 
accuracy and reliability of information being used to drive public policy ultimately is in the best 
interest of scientific research. Increasing access to such data promotes the transparency and 
accountability that is essential to building public trust in government actions and decision-making.” 
Richard Shelby, Accountability and Transparency: Public Access to Federally Funded Research Data, 
37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 371, 379 (2000).  
 20. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Our Science is Sound Science and their Science is Junk 
Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-Producing 
Products and Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 897, 900 (2004) (presenting thesis on how regulatory and 
tort reform movements were an effort to avoid regulatory responsibility). Another product of this 
“sound science” movement took the form of a Supreme Court decision. In 1993, the Supreme Court 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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movement was the creation of the Information Quality Act (IQA).21 
Passed as an obscure rider to a voluminous appropriations bill, the IQA 
has the potential to make significant impacts in the regulatory world.22  
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has promulgated a 
series of guidelines to direct agencies regarding implementation of the 
IQA.23 The recently promulgated guidelines mandating peer review of 
“important scientific information” have been among the more 
controversial manifestations of the IQA.24 The preamble to the regulations 
espouses the benefits of using peer review as a tool to evaluate scientific 
data.25 Some agencies already had established peer review policies in 
place, but the guidelines provide a uniform standard to assess the quality 
of agency science.26 While this new standardized system of review has 
 
 
raised the standards plaintiffs would have to meet before admitting scientific evidence into the court 
room in the landmark case of Daubert v. Merril Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
 21. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 
106-554, § 515(a), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2001) [hereinafter IQA]. For an interesting 
discussion of the motives which generated the “sound science” reform movements in the context of 
both administrative and tort law, see McGarity, supra note 20, at 900–14. A more complete picture of 
the events leading up to the passage of the IQA can be found in CHRIS MOONEY, REPUBLICAN WAR 
ON SCIENCE (2005). See also infra text accompanying notes 65–83. 
 22. The IQA was quietly passed as a rider to a voluminous appropriations bill and requires the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to promulgate guidelines that will ensure and maximize the 
“quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information . . . disseminated by Federal agencies.” 
§ 515(a), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54. See Hornstein, supra note 5, at 232–33 (questioning the 
origins of this legislation); James T. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515: How OIRA’s Expanded Information 
Roles in 2002 Will Impact Rulemaking and Agency Publicity Actions, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 835 
(providing a favorable analysis of the IQA).  
 23. The OMB originally published interim guidelines interpreting the IQA on September 28, 
2001. OMB Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of 
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,718 (Sept. 28, 2001) [hereinafter 
Initial IQA Guidelines]. Following a series of corrections and updates to the guidelines, the OMB 
implemented the final guidelines on February 22, 2002. OMB Guidelines for Ensuring and 
Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal 
Agencies, Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 (Feb. 22, 2002) [hereinafter IQA Implementing 
Guidelines]. The peer review guidelines constituted the next significant rule-making under the IQA. 
OMB Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,024 (Sept. 15, 
2003) [hereinafter Proposed Bulletin]. For a general overview of the various iterations of the IQA 
guidelines, see Sarah Grimmer, Note, Public Controversy Over Peer Review, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 275 
(2005). The OMB has also published all documents related to the IQA on its website at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/infopoltech.html.  
 24. Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664 (Jan. 14, 2005) 
[hereinafter Final Bulletin]. Some scholars question whether the IQA provides sufficient authority for 
the OMB to issue peer review guidelines. See Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB’s Dubious Peer Review 
Procedures, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,064 (2004).  
 25. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2665 (“Peer review is one of the important procedures used to 
ensure that the quality of published information meets the standards of the scientific and technical 
community.”).  
 26. Id. at 2666 (“This Bulletin establishes minimum standards for when peer review is required 
for scientific information and the types of peer review that should be considered by agencies in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss2/5
p461 Mahon book pages.doc11/20/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] REGULATORY PEER REVIEW 465 
 
 
 
 
garnered approval,27 critics are concerned peer review will exploit the 
uncertainties which are inherently present in many scientific 
determinations, making it more difficult for agencies to move forward 
with regulations.28  
This Note will evaluate how the peer review guidelines promulgated by 
the OMB interfere with the ability of agencies to implement rules and 
regulations in accordance with precautionary statutes. Part I of the Note 
will examine the evolution of the precautionary principle and the ways in 
which it has infiltrated the American legal system. Part II will trace the 
development of the peer review guidelines promulgated by the OMB, 
beginning with a general history of the IQA. Part III of this Note will 
examine the implications of requiring agencies to incur an additional layer 
of review when implementing statutes authorizing a precautionary 
approach, including a brief examination of current problems agencies have 
faced as a result of being subjected to IQA challenges. Part IV of this Note 
will propose amending the IQA requirements so that precautionary statutes 
will not be subjected to the same peer review requirements. This can be 
implemented in one of two ways. First, the IQA could be amended so that 
statutes with a precautionary element are not required to abide by the peer 
review regulations. Alternatively, the OMB regulations could be amended 
to expand the exemption to explicitly cover regulations which are 
authorized by precautionary legislation. 
I. EVOLUTION OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN AMERICAN LAW  
When presented with a federal directive to regulate a particular entity 
or activity, administrative agencies are often faced with the difficult task 
of determining the extent of that regulation.29 In making these decisions, 
 
 
different circumstances.”).  
 27. See Grimmer, supra note 23 at 281 nn.39–43 (summarizing comments received by OMB 
praising the peer review guidelines). 
 28. See Lars Noah, Scientific “Republicanism”: Expert Peer Review and the Quest for 
Regulatory Deliberation, 49 EMORY L.J. 1033, 1046 (2000) (“[P]olicymakers often seem to conflate 
peer review with science itself, which in turn may lead them to exaggerate the possible utility of 
independent expert scrutiny of decisions based on science.”). Some scholars, however, have suggested 
that exposing such uncertainties will strengthen agency decisions by forcing policymakers to clearly 
identify the aspects of a regulation where policy considerations, rather than science, informed a 
decision. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1, 47 (2006) (“[P]eer review is not expected to prove any research wrong, but rather to identify 
flaws and deficiencies in a particular research effort that may call into question whether the 
researcher’s conclusions are justified.”).  
 29. See Wagner, supra note 7, at 1618 (describing how vague statutory mandates often leave 
agencies with the task of translating these directives into quantifiable standards).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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government officials will often look to scientific studies for guidance, and 
while important information can be obtained from such studies, policy 
questions are usually left unanswered.30 For example, a scientific 
experiment may provide information on the carcinogenic properties of a 
particular food additive in rodents, but it is the agency that must determine 
how these results will be used in developing a regulation which will both 
protect the public against cancer as well as account for the public interest 
in keeping such an additive on the market.31  
While policy decisions can and should be supported by science, no 
amount of scientific research can provide a conclusive answer where 
policy choices are required.32 For instance, while scientific studies can 
identify effects of certain air pollutants on animals in controlled 
experiments, it fails to answer the question of whether a given regulation 
provides an “adequate margin of safety”33 for the human population, or 
ensures that car emissions will not “endanger the public health or 
welfare.”34 Scientists simply do not have the tools to answer all of these 
questions and agencies must assume the role of using this inconclusive 
evidence to formulate regulations.35  
 
 
 30. See Wagner, supra note 6, at 64, and accompanying text. While this Note focuses on one 
aspect of how science is used in regulatory decisionmaking, scientific interpretations have also created 
problems in the evidentiary setting. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrill Dow, 509 U.S. 579, 590 (landmark 
case establishing standards by which judges may allow certain scientific evidence); Alan Charles Raul 
& Julie Zampa Dwyer, “Regulatory Daubert”: A Proposal to Enhance Judicial Review of Agency 
Science by Incorporating Daubert Principles into Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 
(Autumn 2003). 
 31. See also Wagner, supra note 6, at 64 (describing how toxicology risk assessments combine 
scientific information obtained from toxicity tests on animals with “science-policy judgments” such as 
determining how such exposure will affect humans).  
 32. However, some scholars have argued that agencies have attempted to avoid making these 
difficult policy decisions by relying too heavily on science to answer questions it is unequipped to 
answer. See Wagner, supra note 7, at 1613 (arguing lawmakers have avoided accountability for 
regulatory decisions by exaggerating the contributions of science in regulatory decisions); Salzman & 
Ruhl, supra note 28, at 44–45 (explaining that while the Fish and Wildlife Service was entitled to 
categorize its decision to terminate irrigation practices as part of a species-friendly policy, when the 
agency explained its decision solely in terms of scientific evidence there was no “reasoned alternative” 
by which the agency decision could stand once the science was refuted).  
 33. CAA § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000). This provision of the CAA directs the EPA 
Administrator to establish ambient air quality standards at the level that is required to protect the 
public health by an “adequate margin of safety.” Id. 
 34. CAA § 211(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A) (2000). This section of the CAA authorizes the 
EPA Administrator to regulate the manufacture or sale of certain fuel products, if, in her judgment, 
such products “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public health or welfare.” Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 35. For a specific example of the questions which science can answer (dose-response outcomes 
in mice) and the questions which it can not (how this data should be extrapolated to humans), see 
Wagner, supra note 6, at 65. See also text accompanying notes 7–12. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss2/5
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Moreover, efforts to quantify risk levels in the health and safety context 
are limited by ethical as well as technological concerns.36 Such limitations 
make it difficult to demonstrate with complete certainty whether a 
particular activity presents an unacceptable level of risk to the public 
health or environment such that the activity should be restricted.37 It is 
important for agency decisions to be made on a reasoned basis, and 
preventing the government from acting on science unless it achieves a 
certain level of reliability is a desirable step toward this goal.38 However, 
the government is still expected to protect the public from harm, and 
regulatory delay or inaction may result in the manifestation of predicted 
harms.39  
When scientific research fails to indicate with absolute certainty 
whether a particular regulation is necessary to avoid harm, the decision of 
how to use the science is left to lawmakers.40 Agencies may opt to deal 
with these uncertainties by employing the “wait and see” approach, under 
which no action is taken until underlying concerns are validated by either 
more extensive scientific research or the manifestation of anticipated 
harms. While it may be desirable to create regulations based on concrete 
 
 
 36. See Wagner, supra note 7, at 1620 (citing National Research Council Risk Assessment 
explaining that limitations in epidemiological evidence are due in part to moral prohibition against 
releasing untested chemicals into the environment). Extrapolation from animal studies is often the only 
option and scientists disagree over how to interpret such studies. See, e.g., Jonathon Bender, Societal 
Risk Reduction: Promise and Pitfalls, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 255, 290 (1995) (questioning legitimacy 
of rodent bioassays in assessing human cancer risks); Marvin Goldman, Cancer Risk of Low-Level 
Exposure, 271 SCIENCE 1821 (1996) (criticizing the linear extrapolation model in the context of risk 
assessment).  
 37. See McGarity, supra note 20, at 900 (analogizing the difficult burden of proving causation in 
tort law to the agency task of demonstrating that certain products and activities pose “unacceptable 
risks to public health and the environment”).  
 38. See id. at 900 (arguing that while agencies may not bear the technical burden of proving that 
certain activities or products result in harm, the practical burden of establishing a record that will 
survive “hard-look” review and other administrative mandates requires agencies to produce scientific 
information); Carla Mattix & Kathleen Becker, Scientific Uncertainty Under the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2002) (“Science is more and more being 
touted by public officials . . . as a way to ensure that government decisionmakers are basing their 
decisions on sound, proven principles and not on personal opinions or whim.”).  
 39. These harms are particularly frustrating when the lapse of time fails to produce research that 
suggests the regulation was indeed too restrictive. For example, after withdrawing the new arsenic 
standards established by President Clinton, the Bush Administration announced that a new rule would 
be released in eleven months, following a study by the National Academy of Sciences. However, 
seven months later, the EPA reinstated the rule after finding that the risk was even greater than 
previously believed. Edward Walsh, Arsenic Drinking Water Standard Issued; After Seven-Month 
Scientific Review, EPA Backs Clinton-Established Levels, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2001, at A31. 
 40. See Kriebel et al., supra note 11; Wagner, supra note 7, at 1619–20 (explaining that where 
the limits of science prevent finding a quantitative standard of safety, “policy considerations must fill 
in the gaps that science cannot inform”).  
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results, the limitations of science mean that lawmakers are often left to 
base regulations on nothing more than predictions and models.41 Waiting 
until predictions are verified by reality may lead to an irreversible harm, 
and no amount of regulation or government action will be able to remedy 
the harm caused by regulatory delay.42 
Alternatively, lawmakers can take a precautionary approach by 
choosing to regulate even in the face of scientific uncertainty.43 The 
underlying premise of this regulatory approach known as the 
“precautionary principle” is that where the probability of actual harm is 
unknown, such scientific uncertainty should not prevent the government 
from promulgating regulations which will protect both human health and 
the environment from foreseeable risks.44  
The precautionary principle has been explicitly articulated in many 
nonbinding international agreements as while as binding international 
 
 
 41. In fact, the choice of what model to use in guiding an agency decision also constitutes a 
policy choice as there may be multiple models which are viewed as “scientifically plausible.” Wagner, 
supra note 7, at 1626 (“[T]he choice of one model over another cannot be resolved by science and thus 
must be determined by policy factors.”).  
 42. For a review of instances where precautionary regulation would have been beneficial see 
EUROPEAN ENVTL. AGENCY, LATE LESSONS FROM EARLY WARNINGS: THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE 1896–2000 (Harremoës et al. eds., 2001), available at http://reports.eea.eu.int/ 
environmental_issue_report_2001_22/en/Issue_Report_No_22.pdf. But see Jonathon H. Adler, More 
Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary Principle and the Proposed International Biosafety 
Protocol, 35 TEX. INT’L L.J. 173, 196 (2000) (providing examples where utilizing the precautionary 
approach resulted in harmful consequences).  
 43. Precautionary approaches to legislation and regulation can be further divided into “pre-
emptive precautionary approaches” and “risk-based precautionary approaches.” The first category 
characterizes decisions which are made without sufficient information to determine the level of risk. 
The second category covers actions which occur at the stage of risk assessment where decisionmakers 
may utilize more conservative techniques or assumptions when determining risk levels. See Bernard D. 
Goldstein & Russellyn S. Carruth, Implications of the Precautionary Principle for Environmental 
Regulation in the United States: Examples From the Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants in the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 247, 249–50 (2003). 
 44. While the precautionary principle has been articulated in several different ways, one of the 
most concise formulations is found in the 1992 Rio Declaration—a nonbinding international 
agreement drafted during the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
conducted in Rio de Janeiro. The relevant precautionary language stated that “where there are threats 
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” The United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, ¶ 15, available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?Document 
ID=78&ArticleID=1163. An alternative formulation can be found in the Wingspread Statement on the 
Precautionary Principle. This statement was drafted and signed by a diverse group which included 
farmers, researchers, and attorneys. Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle (Jan. 23–
25, 1998) http://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/precaution-3.html (“Where an activity raises threats of harm to 
the environment or human health, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and 
effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss2/5
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treaties.45 Some countries have employed the principle when promulgating 
domestic policies as well.46 While lawmakers in Washington have been 
more reluctant to embrace the precautionary principle than their European 
counterparts,47 examples of a precautionary approach can be found 
scattered throughout the United States Code.48  
Some statutes incorporate a precautionary aim by establishing low 
evidentiary thresholds by which regulatory action will be triggered.49 For 
instance, when establishing the level at which a given contaminant may be 
found in drinking water, the Safe Drinking Water Act directs the EPA to 
demonstrate that the substance “may have an adverse effect on the health 
of persons,” and is “known to occur or there is a substantial likelihood that 
the contaminant will occur in public water systems.”50 In an effort to 
 
 
 45. See, e.g., Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 
532, 533, available at http://www.pops.int/documents/convtext/convtext_en.pdf (“Acknowledging that 
precaution underlies the concerns of all the Parties and is embedded within this Convention.”). For a 
discussion of other international agreements which incorporate the precautionary principle, see Frank 
B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851, 854 
(1996) (identifying the precautionary principle in the Treaty of Rome, international climate change 
policies, and international principle of sustainable development).  
 46. In Australia, the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment (IGAE) explicitly 
identifies the precautionary principle as one of four principles that should “inform policy making and 
program implementation.” See Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, 1992 §3.5 (Austl.) 
available at http://www.deh.gov.au/esd/national/igae/. For a survey of how the precautionary principle 
has been used internationally, specifically with respect to foreign case law and international treaties 
and agreements, see Scott LaFranchi, Note, Surveying the Precautionary Principle’s Ongoing Global 
Development: The Evolution of an Emergent Environmental Management Tool 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 679 (2005). 
 47. For example, during meetings to prepare an international agreement regulating persistent 
organic pollutants, the United States fought to ensure that the term “precautionary approach” was used 
in place of “precautionary principle,” as the former term was seen as a more flexible phrase providing 
regulated entities with leeway to consider factors other than the environment before taking action. 
MARCO A. OLSON, ANALYSIS OF THE STOCKHOLM CONVENTION ON PERSISTENT ORGANIC 
POLLUTANTS 99–100 (2003).  
 48. Legislation need not explicitly adopt the precautionary principle in order to be interpreted in 
a precautionary manner. See Goldstein & Carruth, supra note 43, at 253–54 (identifying the 
amendments to the 1990 Clean Air Act regulating Hazardous Air Pollutants as precautionary due to its 
focus on technology-based standards rather than risk-assessment). Further, the amendments can been 
seen as precautionary in that they shift the burden to regulated entities by requiring an affirmative 
demonstration that a listed pollutant “may not reasonably be anticipated to cause any adverse effects to 
the human health or adverse environmental effects.” CAA § 112(b)(3)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (b)(3)(C) 
(2000). For examples of other statutes which use technology-based controls to regulate emissions see 
Clean Water Act (CWA) § 301(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (2000) (requiring sources of 
water pollutants to apply the “best available technology economically achievable”); CWA § 306(a)(1), 
33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (2000) (requiring new sources of water pollutants to utilize the “best available 
demonstrated control technology”); CAA § 111, 42 U.S.C § 7411 (2000) (authorizing federal 
government to regulate air emissions from new sources using technology-based standards).  
 49. See Wagner, supra note 6, at 85 (“Many of the mandates governing EPA similarly require 
only limited scientific evidence to justify regulatory intervention . . . .”).  
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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regulate hazardous wastes, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
allows the EPA to define a certain waste as hazardous where “its quantity, 
concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may 
cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality.”51  
Other statutes are worded such that agencies are directed to resolve 
uncertainties in favor of protecting public health.52 Still others allow the 
government to take steps toward corrective action before verification of 
liability in an effort to immediately remedy situations which present a 
hazard to health or safety.53 In permitting agencies to utilize this approach 
where authorized to do so, court decisions reflect judicial recognition of 
the policies justifying such approaches.54  
While these international and domestic examples suggest that the 
precautionary principle has become widely accepted as a means of dealing 
with scientific uncertainty, critics of this approach are prevalent.55 Some 
maintain that the precautionary approach stifles scientific research by 
discouraging the pursuit of complete scientific understanding.56 Others 
have argued that while the competing costs and benefits of regulation are 
 
 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (2000) (emphasis added).  
 52. See, e.g., Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 21 U.S.C. § 346a (b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000) (“As 
used in this section, the term “safe”, with respect to a tolerance for a pesticide chemical residue, means 
that the Administrator has determined that there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from 
aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue.”); Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 2604(f)(1), 2605(a) (2000) (authorizing the Administrator to regulate new and existing toxic 
substances where “there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the manufacture, processing, distribution 
in commerce, use, or disposal of a chemical substance or mixture, or that any combination of such 
activities, presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”). CWA 
§ 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2000) (requiring that states set water quality standards so as “to 
protect the public health or welfare”). 
 53. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
§ 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2000) (preventing judicial review of EPA cleanup orders until after the 
cleanup has been completed).  
 54. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (“Where a statute is 
precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the 
frontiers of scientific knowledge . . . we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and 
effect.”); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 528 (8th Cir. 1975) (recognizing Congress’s 
intent to act in a precautionary manner when it authorized the United States to abate discharges into 
interstate waters which “endanger[ed] . . . the health or welfare of persons”). 
 55. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 45 (criticizing the precautionary principle and its failure to 
address the negative effects that precautionary regulation may have on public health); Goldstein & 
Carruth, supra note 43, at 247 (taking a “cautionary approach to the Precautionary Principle”); Don 
Mayer, The Precautionary Principle and International Efforts to Ban DDT, 9 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 135, 
136–38 (2002) (arguing that utilizing the precautionary principle in efforts to ban DDT has led to 
unpredictable results due to inconsistent applications of the approach).  
 56. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 42 (arguing that excessive regulation of biotechnology can stifle 
the research and development of products that will actually improve health and safety); Goldstein & 
Carruth, supra note 43, at 258 (warning that the precautionary principle provides an excuse to avoid 
acquiring complete scientific understanding).  
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often fervently debated, the benefits of regulatory restraint are often 
overlooked.57 For example, the increased costs of implementing 
precautionary regulations may be felt most acutely by consumers and 
individual workers who must deal with higher prices or lower wages, 
respectively.58 Relying on studies showing a correlation between health 
and wealth, some commentators argue that while precautionary regulations 
may improve some public health problems, others will be exacerbated by 
the financial impact of implementing such regulations.59  
To date, the most effective attacks on precautionary regulations have 
been framed as concerns about agencies making decisions based on “junk 
science”—a pejorative phrase used to characterize the rationale behind 
numerous agency decisions.60 By classifying agency decisions that adopt a 
precautionary approach as scientifically inadequate, cost-benefit 
arguments are avoided.61 As this strategy became more prevalent in the 
1990s, Congress passed two pieces of legislation which established legal 
avenues for challenging agency science.62 
 
 
 57. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 42, at 195 (“[B]y focusing on one set of risks—those posed by 
the introduction of new technologies with somewhat uncertain effects—the precautionary principle 
turns a blind eye to the harms that occur, or are made worse, due to the lack of technological 
development.”);  Frank Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 729, 731 
(1995) (“[A] regulation that reduces disposable income might have an incidental effect of increasing 
death, illness, and injury.”). See also Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1051–52 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (finding that when setting air quality 
standards, the EPA failed to consider the alleged health benefits of tropospheric ozone as a shield from 
the harmful effects of ultraviolet sunlight).  
 58. See Cross, supra note 45, at 915–20 (1996) (arguing that the true financial costs of increased 
regulation are borne by consumers and workers via increased prices, job cuts, and/or reduced wages).  
 59. Id. at 916 (“Unobserved, indirect costs may well dwarf the obvious direct compliance costs 
of environmental and other public health regulation.”). Cross goes on to address the potential health 
implications of decreased economic opportunities by citing studies that indicate wealthier nations have 
longer life expectancies, and that in the United States, those with higher incomes have lower mortality 
rates. Id. at 918.  
 60. PETER HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991). As a fellow 
at the Manhattan Institute, Huber argued that many of the causal associations between toxic exposure 
and disease were largely based on what he termed “junk science.” The Council on Competitiveness, 
created by then-President George H.W. Bush, embraced this term in promoting their regulatory and 
tort liability reform proposals. McGarity, supra note 20, at 905. For an interesting discussion of the 
motives which generated the “sound science” reform movements in the context of both administrative 
and tort law see McGarity, supra note 20. 
 61. See McGarity, supra note 20, at 904–08 (explaining industry claims portraying health and 
environmental regulations as too costly and burdensome presented a “hard sell” to the American 
public, but by replacing efficiency justifications with appeals to agency science, regulatory reformers 
garnered more public support).  
 62. These two statutes are known as the Data Access Amendment, Omnibus Consolidated and 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998), 
and the Information Quality Act, Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal 
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II. THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT AND PEER REVIEW  
At the turn of the century, two pieces of legislation passed through 
Congress virtually unnoticed but have subsequently generated significant 
discussion in the regulatory arena.63 The Data Access Act was a single-
sentence rider to the 1999 appropriations bill and enabled the public to 
request access to data produced by federally-funded studies.64 Just under 
250 words, the IQA was similarly embedded within a voluminous 
appropriations bill and passed through Congress with very little legislative 
discussion.65 The current debate over the IQA and its implementing 
guidelines suggests that the lack of legislative discussion was due to 
unawareness of the bill rather than universal acceptance.66  
The IQA authorizes the OMB to issue guidelines which provide 
“policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and 
maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information 
. . . disseminated by Federal agencies.”67 Each agency is required by the 
 
 
Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515(a), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2001). See infra notes 64–
69 and accompanying text.  
 63. See, e.g., Hornstein, supra note 5; O’Reilly supra note 22; Wendy Wagner, Importing 
Daubert to Administrative Agencies Through the Information Quality Act, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 589. See 
also Improving Information Quality in the Federal Government Before the Government Reform 
Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://reform.house.gov/RA/ 
Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29622. 
 64. 112 Stat. 2681. Introduced as part of the 1999 appropriations bill by Senator Richard Shelby 
(R-AL), the Data Access Amendment (also known as the Shelby Amendment) received very little 
legislative attention. See Hornstein, supra note 5, at 230 (explaining that the Data Access Act was “all 
but invisible throughout the legislative process”). But see Shelby, supra note 19, at 379 (defending the 
passage of the bill and explaining that there was no effort to “conceal” the Data Access provision). 
 65. § 515(a), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54. Like the Data Access Amendment, very little 
legislative history exists surrounding the passage of the IQA. See Nat’l Acad. Of Sci., Ensuring the 
Quality of Data Disseminated by the Federal Government: Workshop #1, at 9 (Mar. 11, 2002), 
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/stl/4-21-02_transcript.doc [hereinafter NAS Workshop] (“The 
[Information Quality Act] was enacted as a rider to an appropriations bill without any hearings or 
extensive legislative history.”) (comments of OMB director John Graham). In fact, the first hearings 
on the Act were not conducted until July 20, 2005. Improving Information Quality in the Federal 
Government Before the Government Reform Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs, 109th Cong. (July 
20, 2005). See generally MOONEY, supra note 21, at 102–20 (providing a more comprehensive look at 
the events surrounding the passage of the IQA).  
 66. See Hornstein, supra note 5, at 232 (“As with the [Data Access Act] the [IQA] hardly 
commanded widespread legislative attention.”); Michelle V. Lacko, Comment, The Data Quality Act: 
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy?, 53 EMORY L.J. 305, 307 (2004) (lamenting the “dearth of 
legislative history” surrounding the passage of the IQA); NAS Workshop, supra note 65, at 32 (“[The 
IQA] came up as part of a very large appropriations act that most people didn’t even know contained 
this particular piece of legislation in it.”) (comments of Alan Morrison).  
 67. § 515(a), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54. The Act goes on to explain that these guidelines are 
an effort to help meet the goals of the Paperwork Reduction Act. Id. The Paperwork Reduction Act 
requires the Director of the OMB to “develop and oversee the implementation of policies, principles, 
standards, and guidelines to apply to Federal agency dissemination of public information.” 44 U.S.C. 
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IQA to establish procedures by which members of the public can seek 
correction of information that fails to meet these information quality 
standards.68  
The IQA contains no reference to peer review as a helpful tool towards 
obtaining this desired quality and integrity of agency data.69 Nevertheless, 
in its initial guidelines interpreting the IQA, the OMB encouraged 
agencies to engage in peer review, and provided general guidance to 
agencies aiming to conduct such reviews.70 In September 2003, the OMB 
took this recommendation a step further when it proposed to supplement 
the IQA guidelines with peer review requirements for important scientific 
information relevant to regulatory policy decisions.71 
In response to numerous comments and discussions with interested 
parties, the OMB issued a Revised Information Quality Bulletin on Peer 
Review (“Revised Bulletin”) on April 28, 2004, to address some of these 
concerns.72 The major changes in this set of guidelines included (1) 
 
 
§§ 3504(d)(1), 3506(a)(1) (2000). Another law that is often cited as providing the OMB with the 
authority to issue regulatory requirements to agencies is Executive Order 12,866. This order, issued by 
President Clinton in 1993, requires agencies to base decisions on the “best reasonably obtainable . . . 
information,” and further requires the OMB to provide agencies with the guidance necessary to engage 
in regulatory planning. Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§1(b)(7), 2(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
Commentators have questioned whether the IQA was intended to grant such a broad power to the 
OMB. See, e.g., McGarity et al., Truth and Science Betrayed: The Case Against the Information 
Quality Act, Center for Progressive Regulation, March 2005 at 2, http://www.progressiveregulation. 
org/articles/iqa.pdf (“The terse statutory language and absence of legislative history support the 
conclusion that Congress did not intend the IQA to serve as a kind of ‘uber statute’ providing OMB 
with the overarching authority to deflect agencies from their statutory responsibilities to implement the 
country’s health, safety and environmental laws.”). 
 68. § 515(a), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54. The IQA requires each federal agency subject to the 
guidelines to “establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to seek and obtain 
correction of information maintained and disseminated by the agency.” Id.  
 69. Id. The Act itself provides no guidance on how agencies should define the terms “quality” 
and “integrity.” To obtain these definitions, agencies must look to the implementing guidelines issued 
by the OMB, which define quality as “an encompassing term comprising utility, objectivity, and 
integrity.” IQA Implementing Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8459. In the IQA Implementing Guidelines, 
integrity is defined as “the security of information—protection of the information from unauthorized 
access or revision, to ensure that the information is not compromised through corruption or 
falsification.” Id. at 8,460.  
 70. See IQA Implementing Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8459–60 (establishing a general 
presumption of objectivity for data which has been subjected to external peer review).  
 71. Proposed Bulletin, 68 Fed. Reg. at 54,026 (“To best serve the President’s policy of 
improving our federal regulatory system . . . [OMB] now proposes to ensure that agencies conduct 
peer reviews of the most important scientific and technical information relevant to regulatory policies 
that they disseminate to the public, and that the peer reviews are reliable, independent, and 
transparent.”).  
 72. OMB, Revised Information Quality Bulletin on Peer Review, 69 Fed. Reg. 23,230 (Apr. 28, 
2004) [hereinafter Revised Bulletin]. The OMB received 187 comments and participated in a public 
workshop at the National Academy of Sciences while also conducting an interagency review which led 
to substantial revisions from the proposed guidelines issued in September of 2003. Id. The summary of 
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providing a more detailed explanation of why peer review guidance is 
needed,73 (2) increased discretion for agencies to decide what method of 
peer review to employ,74 (3) an exemption for time-sensitive regulatory 
information,75 (4) clarification that no new litigation rights against federal 
agencies were created by the IQA,76 (5) defining a more “transparent” 
process for public participation in the planning stages,77 and (6) limiting 
the most rigorous form of peer review to only “highly influential scientific 
assessments.”78  
With significantly fewer comments generated following the April 2004 
guidelines,79 the OMB issued its Final Information Quality Bulletin for 
Peer Review (“Final Bulletin”) on January 14, 2005.80 Recognizing that 
many agencies have existing peer review requirements, the guidelines 
explain that the new regulations establish minimum standards for peer 
 
 
public comments compiled by OMB provides a succinct overview of the contested elements of the 
initial proposal, as well as the actions OMB took to address these concerns. Office of Mgmt. & 
Budget, Summary of Public and Agency Comments on Proposed Bulletin on Information Quality and 
Peer Review, Including Responses by OMB (Apr. 15, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
inforeg/peer_review_comment.pdf [hereinafter Summary of Comments and OMB Responses]. 
 73. Revised Bulletin, 69 Fed. Reg. at 23,232 (explaining the need for uniform standards of peer 
review in order to achieve consistency and transparency in agency decisionmaking). 
 74. Revised Bulletin, 69 Fed. Reg. at 23,234. The guidelines give agencies discretion to 
determine the timing and intensity of the peer review, whether to use individual letter reviews from 
several experts or a panel review, the scope of the review, the criteria for selecting peer reviewers, and 
the degree of public disclosure and participation. Id. Additionally, agencies are permitted to employ 
alternative procedures, provided they have been approved by the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (“OIRA”) Administrator as consistent with the goals of information quality. Id. at 23,237.  
 75. Revised Bulletin, 69 Fed. Reg. at 23,238 (“The Bulletin does not cover time-sensitive 
medical, health, and safety disseminations, or disseminations based primarily on data from a recent 
clinical trial that was adequately peer reviewed before the trial began.”). This exemption was 
eventually broadened such that it is no longer restricted to medical data from clinical trials that were 
subject to adequate peer review prior to the start of the trial, but this language is retained as an 
example. See Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2677.  
 76. Revised Bulletin, 69 Fed. Reg. at 23,242 (“This Bulletin is . . . not intended to create any new 
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States, its 
departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.”).  
 77. Revised Bulletin, 69 Fed. Reg. at 23,241 (“Agencies shall establish a mechanism for 
allowing the public to comment on the adequacy of the peer review plans and designations . . . [and] 
must consider public comments on peer review plans.”).  
 78. Revised Bulletin, 69 Fed. Reg. at 23,240–23,241 (identifying the type of information which 
qualifies as a “highly influential scientific assessment” and explaining the more rigorous peer review 
requirements applicable to this type of information). 
 79. Fifty-seven comments were generated by the revised draft. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 
2664. To view the OMB’s response to these comments, see OMB’s Response to Comments on the 
Revised Peer-Review Bulletin (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/peer2004/ 
peer_response.pdf. 
 80. The OMB explained that the final bulletin represents “minor revisions responsive to the 
public’s comments.” Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2664.  
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review.81 However, the Final Bulletin mandates that “important scientific 
information shall be peer reviewed” by qualified experts before the 
government disseminates this information.82 Even more stringent peer 
review requirements are required for “highly influential scientific 
assessments.”83 In addition to establishing deadlines by which agencies are 
to comply with the guidelines,84 the Final Bulletin provides agencies with 
guidance as to the type of scientific information subject to review,85 the 
type of people who can or should serve as peer reviewers,86 and the 
various mechanisms by which review may be employed.87  
The Final Bulletin generally requires agencies to ensure that all aspects 
of the peer review process are made available to the public including the 
peer reviewers’ names, reports, and agency response to the reports.88 
Potential peer reviewers must also meet certain credentials and 
requirements with an emphasis on utilizing individuals with relevant 
expertise while avoiding conflicts of interest.89 
 
 
 81. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2666 (“This Bulletin establishes minimum standards for when 
peer review is required for scientific information and the types of peer review that should be 
considered by agencies in different circumstances.”). 
 82. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2665 (emphasis added). The Final Bulletin goes on to define 
scientific information as the “factual inputs, data, models, analyses, technical information, or scientific 
assessments based on the behavioral and social sciences, public health and medical sciences, life and 
earth sciences, engineering, or physical sciences.” Id. at 2675. For the OMB’s definition of 
“influential,” see Initial IQA Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8560 (defining “influential” as “information 
that will have or does have a clear and substantial impact on important public policies or important 
private sector decisions”).  
 83. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2675. Regulatory information is subject to the additional 
requirements when the agency determines the information to be a scientific assessment that: “(i) could 
have a potential impact of more than $500 million in any year, or, (ii) is novel, controversial, or 
precedent-setting or has significant interagency interest.” Id.  
 84. The Final Bulletin established two different deadlines by which the planning requirements of 
the Bulletin would go into effect. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2664. As in the Revised Bulletin, 
agencies had twelve months to implement peer review planning requirements for “influential scientific 
information.” Id. The Final Bulletin extended the deadline for “highly influential scientific 
assessments” from four months, Revised Bulletin, 69 Fed. Reg. at 23,238, to six months. Final 
Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2664. 
 85. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2675–76 (defining “scientific information,” “influential 
scientific information,” and “scientific assessment”). The regulations go on to clarify the forms of 
information which will be subject to peer review requirements.  
 86. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2675 (emphasizing experience and independence as important 
criteria for selecting peer reviewers). The guidelines provide similar criteria for choosing peer 
reviewers of “highly influential scientific assessments.” Id. at 2676.  
 87. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2675–76 (listing factors to consider when choosing a 
particular peer review method while also providing agencies with the opportunity to implement 
“alternative procedures”). 
 88. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2675.  
 89. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2669 (indicating that while expertise is the “primary 
consideration,” diverse perspectives with respect to the topic at hand may result in a “sharper, more 
focused peer review”). 
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These guidelines will very likely create new duties for agencies as 
agencies are required to develop peer review agendas and make them 
available to the public.90 These heightened requirements impose an 
additional procedural layer on agencies and raise questions about the 
legitimacy of such action.91 One of the major concerns surrounding peer 
review is that it will further slow the already time-consuming regulatory 
process, resulting in agencies hesitant to even initiate a rulemaking process 
that will cost substantial time and resources.92 Efficiency and accuracy are 
important goals of the administrative process but it is also important to 
ensure that agencies carry out the legislative intent of Congress. Arguably, 
peer review guidelines interfere with congressional directives that instruct 
agencies to act in a precautionary manner.93 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PEER REVIEW FOR PRECAUTIONARY 
LEGISLATION 
The IQA and its agency-wide mandate of peer review conflict with 
existing precautionary legislation. In passing the IQA, Congress 
authorized the OMB to ensure that a certain level of “integrity” was 
preserved in agency decisionmaking and the OMB has broadly interpreted 
 
 
 90. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2672 (requiring agencies to “begin a systematic process of 
peer review planning for influential scientific information” and make these plans publicly available 
through a Web-accessible listing). For examples of peer review guidelines established by various 
agencies, see, e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Peer Review Agenda, http://cfpub.epa.gov/ 
si/si_pr_agenda.cfm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006); U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, Peer Review Agenda, http://www.osha.gov/dsg/peer_review/peer_agenda.html 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2006).  
 91. It is important to distinguish the peer review guidelines from another proposed method of 
reform which relates to judicial review. This method would subject agency science to the same 
evidentiary standard that has been employed by courts since Daubert v. Merril Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 
579 (1993). For a discussion of this proposal, see generally Raul & Dwyer, supra note 30. See also 
Wagner, supra note 6, at 70. 
 92. See Noah, supra note 28, at 1069 (predicting that peer review process will lead to delays in 
rulemaking). Peer review is just one additional procedure that may create disincentives for issuing or 
revising rules. The judicial practice of “hard-look review” has been the subject of criticism for its 
potential to delay the rulemaking process. See generally Thomas McGarity, Some Thoughts on 
“Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the 
Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 455–58 
(1999). But cf. William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal 
Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 444–45 (2000) (finding that hard-look review has not 
significantly interfered with the rulemaking process).  
 93. Many commentators have questioned the legality of OMB’s broad reading of the IQA. See 
generally McGarity et al., supra note 67 (criticizing OMB’s interpretation of the IQA). This, however, 
is not intended to be the focus of this Note. Instead, I specifically address how the peer review 
guidelines interfere with precautionary mandates.  
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this power.94 While the impact of these recently promulgated guidelines is 
still largely speculative,95 mandated peer review has the potential to 
greatly interfere with agency decisionmaking, specifically with respect to 
precautionary legislation.96  
 
 
 94. While the peer review guidelines have been a topic of debate, the Information Quality Act as 
a whole has also been the subject of criticism. On July 20, 2005, the first hearing on the IQA was 
conducted before the subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs. Improving Information Quality in the 
Federal Government Before the Government Reform Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs, 109th 
Cong., 7–11 (2005) [hereinafter IQA Hearings] (testimony of Sidney Shapiro, Scholar Center for 
Progressive Reform). In his comments, Shapiro explained how petitioners have used the IQA to 
bypass Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) procedures in order to access data. Id. at 7. He also 
provides an example of industry exploiting an agency’s failure to abide by IQA procedures, regardless 
of the alternative procedures to which various studies may have been subjected. Id. at 9. In this way, 
industries have been able to successfully delay agency rulings by initiating a separate challenge to 
agency action by way of the IQA. Id. Shapiro then argues that while there is no evidence that Congress 
intended the IQA to establish substantive legal standards, petitioners have succeeded in effectively 
imposing such standards by bringing IQA challenges. Id. at 9. Lastly, Shapiro argues that regulatory 
challenges have been brought under the IQA instead of, or in addition to, the procedures already 
provided by the administrative system resulting in increased delays. Id. at 11. See also Urs Grasser, 
Information Quality and the Law, or, How to Catch a Difficult Horse, in INFORMATION QUALITY 
REGULATION: FOUNDATIONS, PERSPECTIVES, AND APPLICATIONS, 213–45 (Urs Gasser ed., 2004), 
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/2003-08 (classifying OMB’s interpretation of 
“information” as broad); McGarity et al., supra note 67 (questioning OMB’s interpretation of the 
IQA); Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB’s Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. 
INST.) 10064 (2004) (questioning OMB’s authority to require peer review).  
 95. Agencies have had time however, to gain experience with other requirements of the IQA. 
The initial guidance regarding implementation of the IQA was issued by the OMB in February 2002. 
In these guidelines, the OMB defined the terms of the IQA and directed agencies to create their own 
information quality guidelines. Final IQA Guidelines, supra note 23, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8452. See, e.g., 
Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information 
Disseminated by the Environmental Protection Agency, Oct. 2002, http://www.epa.gov/quality/ 
informationguidelines/documents/EPA_InfoQualityGuidelines.pdf; Department of the Interior 
Information Quality Guidelines Pursuant to Section 515 of the Treasury and General Government 
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, http://www.doi.gov/ocio/guidelines/515Guides.pdf. The 
actual number of requests generated by the IQA is in dispute. In a Fiscal Year 2003 report to Congress, 
the OMB identified the number of correction requests to be “about 35.” OMB, Information Quality: A 
Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 2003, 8, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/fy03_ 
info_quality_rpt.pdf. Another group, however, found that the number of substantive IQA requests was 
actually much closer to 100. OMBWatch, The Reality of the Information Quality Act’s First Year: A 
Correction of OMB’s Report to Congress (July 2004) DQ-5. Under either interpretation, the EPA has 
received a disproportionate number of requests. EPA, Information Quality Guidelines—Requests for 
Correction (RFC) and Requests for Reconsideration (RFR) Submitted to EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 
quality/informationguidelines/iqg-list.html (documenting over thirty-five IQA requests). 
 96. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 28, at 40 (identifying the potential to delay regulatory 
decisionmaking as one of three major critiques lodged against the peer review guidelines). For 
example, when Congress has allowed an agency such as the EPA to categorize a substance as 
hazardous under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the scientific evidence need only show 
that a particular solid waste “may cause or significantly contribute to” an increase in mortality or 
serious illness. RCRA § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (2000). Inserting a requirement of peer review 
into this process could force agencies to delay this classification until peer review is completed. See 
also Wagner, supra note 6, at 100–02 (discussing other components of the IQA that may interfere with 
statutory mandates).  
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As discussed in Part I, the United States Code is replete with examples 
of precautionary legislation, specifically where public health and safety are 
concerned.97 It is important that agencies make regulatory decisions based 
on the best science possible, but where Congress has directed agencies to 
act in a precautionary manner, Congress manifested an intent to regulate 
even in the face of uncertainty.98 This suggests that Congress was less 
concerned about the consequences of dealing with regulation that might 
prove to be unnecessary than about the potential consequences of inaction. 
From this, it follows that where safety and public health are of primary 
concern, timely promulgation is also desired. 
It is not clear that the IQA peer review guidelines directly interfere 
with the legislative intent of precautionary legislation. Precautionary 
statutes typically authorize a lower burden of scientific proof, enabling 
agencies to make decisions based on even a small bit of evidence that a 
particular harm may result.99 Peer review does not raise this burden or 
require agencies to engage in more scientific research.100 Instead, the 
guidelines mandate that the studies used be subjected to external review so 
that inconsistencies or uncertainties can be exposed.101 Those who support 
peer review have suggested that it could actually improve agency 
 
 
 97. See, e.g., RCRA § 3004(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(e)(1) (2000) (precluding the Administrator 
from finding a method of land disposal protective of human health and the environment “unless . . . it 
has been demonstrated to the Administrator, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that there will be no 
migration of hazardous constituents from the disposal unit or injection zone for as long as the wastes 
remain hazardous”) (emphasis added); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) 
(2000) (authorizing regulation of contaminants where EPA has found such contaminants “may have an 
adverse effect on the health of persons”) (emphasis added). See also supra text accompanying notes 
48–52. 
 98. See supra note 52. 
 99. See Wagner, supra note 6, at 85 (“Most of the protective statutes were passed with the 
explicit purpose of by-passing heavy burdens of proof and allowing agencies to regulate on the basis 
of limited scientific evidence.”). Wagner goes on to provide an example of precautionary legislation 
implemented by the FDA. Id. at 85. This statute, known as the Delaney Clause, requires the FDA to 
ban a food or color additive where just a single study shows that this additive is cancerous to animals. 
21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c)(3)(A), 379e(b)(5)(B) (2000).  
 100. In fact, in the scientific world, peer review is not intended to be a replication of results 
through independent research, but is instead meant to evaluate the methods employed by researchers. 
See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 28, at 13. Salzman and Ruhl identify ten factors which the scientific 
journal Ecology has advised reviewers to address when conducting peer review: “(1) importance and 
interest to this journal’s readers; (2) scientific soundness; (3) originality; (4) degree to which 
conclusions are supported; (5) organization and clarity; (6) cohesiveness of argument; (7) length 
relative to information content; (8) whether material should be moved to the digital appendices; (9) 
conciseness and writing style; and (10) appropriateness for the targeted journal and specific section of 
the journal.” Id.  
 101. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2665. (explaining that peer review “can filter out biases and 
identify oversights, omissions, and inconsistencies,” and “also may encourage authors to more fully 
acknowledge limitations and uncertainties”). 
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efficiency by reducing the likelihood of subsequent legal challenges.102 
While the OMB may use this argument in an effort to deflect criticism, it 
is far too speculative to sufficiently address concerns.  
Moreover, subjecting agencies to these additional requirements may 
serve to indirectly slow the regulatory process. Initially, government 
regulators will have to direct their attention to implementing a “peer 
review plan.”103 Even the OMB acknowledged that this would be a time-
consuming process, and in the Final Bulletin the deadline by which 
agencies must meet planning requirements for “highly influential scientific 
assessments” was extended to accommodate these concerns.104 
Additionally, redirecting agency resources could slow down the 
implementation of other regulations.105 Moreover, a peer review is only 
deemed completed once the agency has considered and addressed the 
comments of the reviewers, extending the process even further.106 While 
many factors may contribute to an agency being forced to redirect 
resources, it is problematic when this directive comes not from Congress, 
or even the agency itself, but instead from a separate agency.107  
 
 
 102. The OMB provides a cost-benefit analysis to explain that delays incurred as a result of 
developing peer review panels may be outweighed by the potential benefits of more stable decisions. 
See Summary of Comments and OMB Responses, at 13 (“[A] study may reduce the probability that 
the policy is reversed or may lead to creative policy innovations that increase benefits and/or reduce 
costs.”).  
 103. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2676. The guidelines require agencies to post agendas of peer 
review plans and describe the components that must be included in each plan. For example, agencies 
must identify whether the dissemination is influential or highly influential, the method that will be 
used to conduct the review, and the way in which reviewers will be selected. Id.  
 104. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2664. Under the guidelines implemented in April 2004, the 
planning requirements for highly influential scientific assessments were to go into effect four months 
after publication of the final guidelines, while planning requirements for influential scientific 
information would go into effect one year after publication. Revised Bulletin, 69 Fed. Reg. at 23,238. 
The Final Bulletin extended the former deadline to six months, but kept the one year deadline for 
influential scientific information. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2664.  
 105. In fact, on January 7, 2004, a letter signed by twenty former agency officials was sent to the 
OMB, arguing that the peer review proposal would result in “increased costs and delays in 
disseminating information to the public and in promulgating health, safety, and environmental and 
other regulations.” Letter from Carol M. Browner et al., Former Administrator, Environmental 
Protection Agency, to Joshua B. Bolten, Director of Office of Management and Budget (Jan. 9, 2004) 
(on file with author), available at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/Letter_Bolten_Sig.pdf. 
 106. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2670 (“A peer review is considered completed once the 
agency considers and addresses the reviewers’ comments.”).  
 107. Further evidence that regulatory peer review lacked full congressional support is provided by 
the fact that efforts to pass a bill requiring such across-the-board mandates failed in the late 1990s. See, 
e.g., Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S. 746, 106th Cong. (1999); Science Integrity Act, H.R. 
574, 106th Cong. (1999) (bill would require “peer review of scientific data used in support of Federal 
regulations, and for other purposes”). 
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Additionally, agencies may be forced to subject studies to peer review 
before using these studies to make decisions.108 Alternatively, agencies 
may choose to refrain from utilizing this information entirely, in the hopes 
of avoiding potential IQA challenges.109 In fact, the EPA has already 
fielded IQA challenges that have attacked agency decisions in part because 
of inadequate peer review.110 The OMB purports to give agencies 
discretion to choose an adequate peer review mechanism considering a 
variety of factors, including “the extent of prior reviews.”111 However, the 
OMB goes on to qualify this otherwise broad agency discretion by 
pointing out that an agency may find itself in circumstances that require “a 
more rigorous or transparent review process.”112 Such language makes an 
agency susceptible to challenges on the basis of its decision to determine 
that a particular study is valid, in addition to challenging the science 
itself.113 
Those who support peer review expect this additional layer of review 
to strengthen regulatory decisions by reducing the appearance of conflict 
of interest.114 These advocates argue that those who work in agencies have 
inherent biases that show forth in certain regulations, and peer review will 
allow unbiased scientists to evaluate the data and make sure decisions are 
 
 
 108. See, e.g., Letter from Wood Preservative Science Council (WPSC) to EPA Information 
Quality Guidelines Staff, 6 (Oct. 17, 2005) [hereinafter October Letter from WPSC], available at 
http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/documents/06001.pdf (arguing that, unless or until 
peer review is conducted of EPA study evaluating safety and efficacy of wood treatment coatings, the 
study “should not be cited or relied upon”). 
 109. Wagner, supra note 6, at 100 (“To the extent that Congress explicitly requires EPA to 
consider all ‘available information’ in promulgating protective standards, the exclusion of studies 
under the good-science reforms conflicts with EPA’s mandate.”).  
 110. See, e.g., Letter from WPSC to EPA Information Quality Guidelines Staff (Sept. 2, 2005), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/documents/05007.pdf (criticizing lack 
of external peer review of EPA documents related to cancer risks of inorganic arsenic); October Letter 
from WPSC; CRE Petition filed with EPA re: Diisononyl Phthalate, 2–3 (Oct. 16, 2003), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/documents/13166rfc.pdf (referencing OMB peer 
review guidelines and requesting external peer review of information underlying proposed Toxics 
Release Inventory listing). 
 111. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2671. Other factors to which agencies are directed to give 
“due consideration” include the novelty and complexity of the particular study, the impact of the study 
on decisionmaking, and the costs and benefits of conducting additional review. Id.  
 112. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2671.  
 113. It is true that the OMB has established that the peer review guidelines do not create any 
additional enforcement mechanism. However, this has not stopped those opposed to certain regulations 
from submitting challenges to agencies, and while agencies may technically be able to ignore such 
challenges, it would be a politically destructive route and few administrative bodies would be willing 
to wait and see what consequences would result from such action.  
 114. Proposed Bulletin, 68 Fed. Reg. at 54025 (“Evaluation by external reviewers thus can 
enhance the credibility of the peer review process by avoiding both the reality and the appearance of 
conflict of interest.”).  
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still sufficiently “sound.”115 However, it is more likely the case that 
exploiting these unavoidable scientific uncertainties116 will serve to 
undermine regulations which, despite inconclusive evidence, may still be 
warranted.117 
OMB also attempts to counter suggestions that the guidelines will slow 
the promulgation of regulation by explaining that peer review is meant to 
be conducted early in the process and in this way will not interfere with 
the timely promulgation of decisions.118 However, agencies may be 
slowed down by lengthy peer review that may not be initiated until later in 
the regulatory process.119 The guidelines concede that adding review at 
this juncture could have very little impact on the rulemaking process.120 
This would essentially render the review an unnecessary expenditure of 
agency time and resources.121 
The consequences of foregoing such review remain unclear, but give 
rise to several troubling implications: first, it will increase the chance that 
the new regulation will be subjected to legislative challenges, which would 
slow implementation to a greater degree;122 second, by requiring annual 
reports on peer review, the OMB is able to keep close tabs on agency 
compliance (or lack thereof) with the guidelines.123 In its “Response to 
Comments on the Revised Peer-Review Bulletin” the OMB countered 
concerns that the Bulletin lacked an enforcement mechanism by 
emphasizing the annual reporting requirement and the ability of the public 
to monitor agency activities through the peer-review planning process.124 
 
 
 115. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 28, at 13 (explaining personal bias may play role in altering 
neutrality of agency scientists focused on furthering a specific statutory mission). 
 116. See Doremus, supra note 12. 
 117. EPA’s arsenic standard, discussed supra note 39, provides an example where a particular 
administrative action turned out to be justified despite initial uncertainties.  
 118. Summary of Comments and OMB Responses, at 12 (“Even a lengthy peer review would not 
necessarily delay an agency action if the review is conducted on a parallel track with other work of the 
agency on that action.”).  
 119.  Summary of Comments and OMB Responses, at 12 (recognizing that “delay in government 
decision-making . . . can result from peer review”).  
 120. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2668 (“If review occurs too late, it is unlikely to contribute to 
the course of a rulemaking.”). 
 121. The OMB has conceded this as well, recognizing that “if a policy or regulation is delayed and 
the peer review does not lead to changes in the policy or regulation, then the benefits . . . could be 
delayed.”  Summary of Comments and OMB Responses, at 12.  
 122.  Summary of Comments and OMB Responses, at 12. These concerns are analogous to those 
raised with respect to “hard-look” review of agency decisions. As more and more factors can be 
considered under judicial review, agencies will spend more and more time making sure each of these 
factors have been addressed. See supra note 38.  
 123. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2677 (“Each agency shall provide to OIRA, by December 15 
of each year, a summary of the peer reviews conducted by the agency during the fiscal year.”).  
 124. OMB’s Response to Comments on the Revised Peer-Review Bulletin, 3 (Dec. 15, 2004), 
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The OMB suggested that those who are dissatisfied with an agency’s peer 
review mechanisms can utilize these tools to alert policy officials in the 
agency.125 While the OMB is vague about what consequences might 
result, decisions to forego peer review requirements could be a risky 
venture from an agency perspective.  
The guidelines carefully establish that in making decisions regarding 
the dissemination of information, “agencies are not expected to cede their 
discretion . . . to peer reviewers.”126 Instead, the results of peer review are 
simply intended to be another factor in the decision of whether to 
disseminate information.127 However, while agencies may not be handing 
over their decision-making power to outside peer reviewers, the guidelines 
may indirectly alter the ability of an agency to implement statutory 
mandates with a precautionary goal. By requiring agencies to engage in 
this additional procedural step before relying on certain information in 
making regulatory or policy decisions, the OMB has arguably removed 
some degree of agency discretion.128 For example, a request for correction 
was recently filed challenging many perceived deficiencies in an EPA 
study, naming the lack of peer review as one such deficiency.129 The EPA 
must handle this correction request before proceeding,130 and if the agency 
determines that peer review is required, it could be months before the EPA 
is able to take action in reliance on this study.131  
 
 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/peer2004/peer_response.pdf.  
 125. Id. (“If the public and/or OMB are not satisfied with agency compliance under the Bulletin, 
they can raise these concerns with policy officials in the agency.”).  
 126. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2666.  
 127. Id. (“Peer review reports are an important factor in information dissemination decisions but 
rarely . . . the sole consideration.”). In supporting this assertion, the OMB analogizes the role of an 
agency official to the role of the editor of a scientific journal in that both consider peer review in 
making decisions, but the final decision must be made by the agency official or editor—an individual 
who can be held accountable. Id. 
 128. Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2667.  
 129. See October Letter from WPSC, supra note 108. The study in question was conducted to 
evaluate the effectiveness of various coatings in preventing the release of toxic chemicals from treated 
wood. This request was filed on behalf of the WPSC, a trade association of manufacturers of wood 
preservatives often used in this treatment process. Id.  
 130. WSPC acknowledged that this study would likely be used by the EPA to regulate the use and 
maintenance of wood-treated products in the home and recreational areas such as parks and 
playgrounds. Id. at 2. Regardless of whether the EPA determines that corrective action is necessary, 
the agency must at least address the request and provide notice of its decision. See Guidelines for 
Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated 
by the Environmental Protection Agency, Oct. 2002, http://www.epa.gov/quality/information 
guidelines/documents/EPA_InfoQualityGuidelines.pdf.  
 131. However, it appears that little in the regulations would prevent an agency from making a 
policy-based decision at this point, as long as the agency provided a reasoned explanation of its 
particular policy choice. For an interesting discussion on how the peer review regulations could help 
agencies better distinguish between policy and science decisions, see Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 28, 
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By carefully excluding an enforcement mechanism and articulating the 
desire to keep policy decisions within the hands of agencies, the peer 
review guidelines superficially appear to avoid interfering with statutory 
mandates. With no explicit consequences for failure to comply, it is hard 
to accuse the OMB of creating situations which will slow regulations. 
However, for those in favor of deregulation, it will likely prove to be an 
effective tool in obstructing the purposes behind precautionary statutes. 
Attacking an agency’s inadequate peer review will simply become another 
weapon against regulatory actions, and agencies have already been forced 
to respond.132 Where peer review slows the regulatory process of 
implementing regulations intended to have a precautionary purpose it 
violates statutory mandates of Congress.133  
IV. AMENDING THE IQA  
By mandating a certain level of review and research before allowing 
agencies to rely on certain studies, the peer review guidelines delay the 
point at which regulations based on these studies can be promulgated and 
thereby interfere with agency decision-making.134 In this way, the OMB 
 
 
at 46 (explaining that by highlighting areas not supported by science, peer review could force agencies 
to identify the nonscientific factors that support policy decisions). But cf. Wagner, supra note 7, at 
1700 (arguing peer review may actually enable agencies to mask policy decisions as scientific 
determinations, making it more difficult for the public to participate in the process while leaving 
important decisions in the hands of unaccountable scientists).  
 132. In a recent data quality challenge to the diesel particulate standard promulgated by the Mine 
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), the lack of peer review was cited as one of the reasons 
why the agency’s rule was inadequate. Letter from Patton Boggs LLP to Elaine Chao, U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor (Aug. 10, 2005), available at http://www.dol.gov/cio/programs/infoguidelines/ (requires 
authorization). Less than a month later, while not directly responding to this data request, MSHA 
published a modification of the original rule and proposed to phase in the new standard rather than 
require compliance by January 2006. Diesel Particulate Matter Exposure of Underground Metal and 
Nonmetal Mines, 70 Fed. Reg. 53,280 (Sept. 5, 2005). 
 133. The fact that only a few agencies have deemed it necessary to adopt peer review policies, and 
that they have done so only in limited situations, suggests that such a broad mandate is unnecessary. 
See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 28, at 19 (citing policy of Fish & Wildlife Service to use peer review 
when making endangered species-listing decisions as one of the few examples of regulatory peer 
review). 
 134. See Marcilynn A. Burke, Klamath Farmers and Cappuccino Cowbows: The Rhetoric of the 
Endangered Species Act and Why It (Still) Matters, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 441, 508–09 
(outlining how the guidelines have allowed the OMB to exert control over agency procedures and 
“advance a subversive, deregulatory agenda”); Rick Weiss, Peer Review Plan Draws Criticism, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2004, at A19 (characterizing opponents’ view of peer review guidelines as 
government effort “to inject White House politics into the world of science and to use the uncertainty 
that surrounds science to delay new rules that could cost regulated industries millions of dollars”). The 
OMB peer review guidelines provide just one example of the Administration’s efforts to resort to 
science as the basis for delaying regulations. For another example, see supra note 39. 
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has assumed a legislative power that Congress never clearly provided it 
through the IQA.135 
Agencies should be left to employ the precautionary principle where 
Congress has authorized action despite the absence of complete scientific 
certainty.136 The requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”) and availability of judicial review of agency action provide 
safeguards to ensure that agencies make reasoned decisions.137 While 
commentators have suggested that the peer review guidelines will force 
agencies to distinguish between decisions based on policy and those based 
on science,138 rather than subject agencies to a review process that will 
slow the promulgation of regulations, in the face of scientific uncertainty, 
agencies should be left to make the decision of whether to employ a 
precautionary approach and regulate, or wait for the scientific evidence to 
confirm or refute concerns.139 
If Congress decides that peer review is appropriate, these mandates 
should be implemented by way of legislative changes. Several examples 
exist where Congress has specifically called for peer review,140 and such 
 
 
 135. See McGarity et al., supra note 67, at 2 (“Even though the only explicit congressional 
directive was a mandate to issue guidelines on agency implementation of data correction procedures, 
OMB read these ministerial responsibilities extremely broadly . . . .”). In his testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs, Sidney Shapiro similarly questioned the OMB’s broad 
interpretation of a statute which had such “suspicious origins.” See IQA Hearings, supra note 94, at 13 
(testimony of Sidney Shapiro). 
 136. See, e.g., supra notes 48–52. For example, the Endangered Species Act authorizes the Fish 
and Wildlife Service to base its decisions on “the best scientific and commercial data available,” 16 
U.S.C. § 1536(c) (2000), ensuring that the agency will act on the basis of sound scientific information 
while leaving room for the agency to act in the absence of complete certainty.  
 137. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000). The APA explicitly allows for 
courts to overturn agency decisions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). Agencies must also provide an opportunity 
for the public to comment on these rules and the final rule must include a response to these comments. 
Id. Courts also play an oversight role in the administrative process, by reviewing challenges to agency 
decisions to ensure that there is a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) 
(citation omitted). See also Wagner, supra note 6, at 81–82 (asserting that the ever-present threat of 
court challenges deters agencies from committing significant scientific errors). But see Salzman & 
Ruhl, supra note 28, at 20 (suggesting that the requirements of the APA fail to address situations 
where agencies have attempted to “stretch the available science in support of its policy decision farther 
than is justified”). 
 138. Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 28, at 45 (“[R]egulatory peer review . . . would encourage 
agencies to provide sharper delineations between scientific and policy bases for decisions.”).  
 139. Moreover, it is unclear whether peer review will actually encourage agencies to be more 
forthcoming regarding policy-based decisions, or instead provide another way for lawmakers to mask 
policy with science. See Wagner, supra note 7, at 1700 (explaining various ways in which peer review 
can enable decision-makers to hide behind the science of a decision rather than acknowledge the 
underlying policy choices).  
 140. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (2000) (establishing the Clean Air Scientific 
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decisions should remain in the hands of legislators.141 In fact, before the 
IQA, efforts to pass legislation imposing broad peer review requirements 
repeatedly failed, and it hardly seems appropriate for the OMB to assume 
this role.142  
The proposed amendments to the Endangered Species Act provide one 
example of legislative action that directly references the IQA.143 These 
changes include specifically requiring compliance with the IQA guidelines 
while also instituting more formalized peer-review processes with respect 
to certain listing and habitat decisions.144 At the time of submission, none 
of these proposals had managed to survive both houses of Congress, but if 
the procedures authorized under the IQA guidelines are subsequently 
approved, it will become difficult to argue that the legislative intent behind 
a precautionary statute is being contradicted.145 Moreover, requiring 
Congress to look at how these peer review requirements will affect a 
 
 
Advisory Committee to review EPA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards under the Clean Air 
Act); Federal Fungicide, Insecticide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136w(e) (2000) (mandating peer 
review of major scientific studies conducted by or for the EPA); Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(13) (1994) (“All studies and results 
of research conducted under this subsection (other than health assessments) shall be reported or 
adopted only after appropriate peer review.”). Several agencies have also established scientific 
advisory panels which review various aspects of agency decisionmaking. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2039 
(2000) (establishing advisory committee for Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review safety studies 
and license applications); 29 U.S.C. § 656 (2000) (establishing a National Advisory Committee on 
Occupational Safety and Health); 49 U.S.C. § 44912(c) (2000) (establishing a scientific advisory panel 
for the Federal Aviation Administration).  
 141. Several scholars have questioned the authority of the OMB to implement such broad 
guidelines. See McGarity et al., supra note 67, at 2–6 (questioning the dubious origins of the IQA and 
providing a historical look at the events leading up to its passage). See also Information Quality 
Hearings, supra note 94, at 13 (testimony of Sidney Shapiro).  
 142. See, e.g., Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S. 746, 106th Cong. (1999); Science 
Integrity Act, H.R. 574, 106th Cong. (1999) (bill would require “peer review of scientific data used in 
support of Federal regulations, and for other purposes”). See also McGarity et al., supra note 67, at 10 
(“The IQA says nothing about peer review, and efforts to impose such broad requirements across 
federal agencies have repeatedly failed in Congress throughout the last decade.”). 
 143. The proposed changes have been aimed at improving the way federal agencies deal with 
scientific evidence in implementing the Act. See Burke, supra note 134, at 506–07. 
 144. Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005, H.R. 3824, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(directing the Secretary of the Interior to take necessary measures to ensure (1) compliance with the 
OMB guidelines implementing the IQA and (2) that the data consists of empirical information or that 
data has been subject to qualified peer review procedures). Earlier efforts at amending the bill failed to 
pass through both houses of Congress. See, e.g., Endangered Species Data Quality Act of 2004, H.R. 
1662, 108th Cong. (2004) (explicitly requiring compliance with the IQA); Sound Science for 
Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2002, H.R. 4840, 107th Cong. (2002) (establishing a 
preference for peer reviewed data). 
 145. House Bill 3824 was referred to the Senate Committee on September 30, 2005. THOMAS 
(Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:h.r.03824: (last visited Sept. 29, 
2006). 
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particular statutory scheme will prevent broad application of peer review 
standards in situations where it will prove too burdensome.146  
Alternatively, Congress could amend the IQA statute such that statutes 
with a precautionary purpose are not required to abide by these 
regulations. Much of the commentary in response to the IQA has 
expressed concern over its potential to impede an already overburdened 
regulatory process.147 Agencies should again be given discretion to 
promulgate regulations without being hindered by unnecessary and 
unwarranted challenges.  
At a minimum, the OMB regulations could be rewritten to extend an 
exemption to information that is used to promulgate regulations authorized 
by precautionary legislation. As it currently stands, the exemption is too 
narrow to sufficiently cover all precautionary regulations.148 Moreover, the 
exemption itself constitutes a judgment call which could also become the 
subject of challenges and subsequent delay. By allowing agencies to 
clearly establish what sorts of regulations or statutes are considered 
“precautionary” such that they fall into this exemption, agencies would be 
able to act quickly on information that is relevant to these particular 
statutes. Furthermore, requiring agencies to identify statutes up front 
would eliminate any concerns that agencies will constantly avoid peer 
review requirements simply by citing the need to act in a precautionary 
manner.  
Agencies have been entrusted to make policy choices for decades.149 
Under the APA, agencies are required to show a reasoned basis for 
 
 
 146. Another alternative would be for Congress to propose a bill implementing peer review 
procedures which are similar or even identical to those put forth in the IQA guidelines. Open debate 
and committee discussions would allow lawmakers to address the implications of choosing to adopt or 
forgo an agency-wide mandate of peer review. While I still oppose adopting such a policy, at least by 
allowing members of Congress to engage in open debate about the concerns raised by such legislation, 
the resulting requirements would have more legitimacy than the current OMB-promulgated guidelines. 
 147. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 28, at 40 (citing the fear that peer review requirements will 
significantly delay regulatory requirements as a “major institutional critique of regulatory peer 
review”). Various aspects of the regulatory process have been cited as the source for slowing down the 
promulgation of regulation. For a discussion of how judicial “hard-look” review has contributed to the 
time-consuming nature of rulemaking, see Thomas McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of 
Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525 (1997).  
 148. See Final Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2677 (limiting exemption to health or safety 
disseminations “where the agency determines that the dissemination is time-sensitive (e.g., findings 
based primarily on data from a recent clinical trial that was adequately peer reviewed before the trial 
began)”). 
 149. See Wagner, supra note 6 (recognizing that protective statutes allowed agencies to “regulate 
on the basis of limited scientific evidence”); Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 28, at 44 (recognizing that 
policy decisions are often made by regulatory agencies because “Congress rarely commands that an 
agency decision be based solely on scientific evidence conclusively proving the decision correct”).  
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decisions, and there are multiple safeguards in place to ensure this process 
is carried out.150 Judicial review already provides a remedy to address 
arbitrary and capricious decisions, and this check on agency action has 
itself generated a great deal of criticism.151 The rulemaking process is 
already incredibly time-consuming, and lawmakers should be focused on 
improving the efficiency of this process, rather than erecting more barriers. 
Where Congress has authorized an agency to act in a precautionary 
manner, it is inappropriate for any other branch of government to prevent 
implementation of rules in accordance with this policy.152  
CONCLUSION 
While it is difficult to fault a process that aims, at least superficially, to 
improve the interpretations of scientific data, the mandate of peer review 
raises some major policy concerns. Ideally, an external review will have 
the effect of bolstering agency claims because the science behind policy 
decisions will have more force.153 But by highlighting areas where the 
science remains uncertain, peer review enables affected parties to exploit 
these uncertainties. Where Congress has authorized agencies to make 
decisions based on evidence which is less than conclusive—a common 
occurrence in the field of scientific research—these uncertainties should 
not be a bar to regulation. While the OMB empowers agencies to make 
their own decisions regardless of what the results of the peer review are, it 
may provide another tool by which those unhappy with the regulations are 
able to attack agency decisions.  
The legislature should be responsible for authorizing the incorporation 
of peer review policies in various statutes. The OMB guidelines have the 
indirect effect of slowing regulations. Where Congress has expressly 
 
 
 150. See supra note 137. 
 151. See McGarity, supra note 147. 
 152. It is true that the judiciary may also play a role in preventing implementation of certain 
administrative decisions. However, the role of judicial review is explicitly authorized by the APA. 5 
U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2000). This explicit authorization stands in stark contrast to the vague language of 
the IQA and the OMB’s broad interpretation of this language. Moreover, even with the explicit grant 
of judicial review, commentators have questioned the legitimacy of various forms of judicial review 
and suggested that it goes beyond the scope of review granted by the APA. For more discussion see 
Jordan supra note 92; Richard W. Murphy, The Limits of Legislative Control Over the “Hard-Look,” 
56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1125 (2004); Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and 
Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 768 
(“Deliberative democratic theory provides a compelling normative argument in favor of [hard-look] 
judicial review as a protector of increased citizen participation and deliberative government.”). 
 153. OMB suggested this in both the preamble and in its responses to comments. See supra note 
122. 
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authorized agencies to exercise an approach which is precautionary in 
nature, a separate agency should not be able to interfere with these policy 
concerns by imposing burdensome procedural mandates. As a result, 
agencies should only be forced to subject scientific information to peer 
review requirements when it is clear that this review will not interfere with 
the timely promulgation of regulations meant to protect public health, 
safety, and the environment.  
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